Someone pointed out that they didn't
feel I understood the point behind being able to engage single
targets at 500 meters with precision rifle fire. I actually
understand the theoretical application of small teams of specialized
riflemen extremely well. Hell, I even like the concept
intellectually, because of the Revolutionary War-era/frontiersman
mystique that surrounds the concept (Morgan's Riflemen, Francis
Marion and his South Carolina irregulars, The Green Mountain Boys,
etc). There is even a real place for it in UW, although, like a lot
of "cool" ideas (suppressors, NODs, etc), their
applications in UW/resistance operations tend to be much more limited
than Joe Snuffy from the Block envisions.
I can ring steel silhouettes at 500+,
with iron sights, all day long, under field conditions, in the wind
and snow even. I've made one-shot stops, in combat, at 600+
(admittedly, running an ACOG), with an M4. Hell, HH6 can ring steel
silhouettes at 400 and 500, with at least 75% hits.
The idea of hit-and-run sniper teams is
fine. If you're a sniper, with the requisite fieldcraft, it might
even work for some applications...route interdiction comes to mind.
Harassing fire on fixed installations, and targeted assassination of
specific regime personnel...you know, typical sniper missions. As a
"normal" small-unit mission? I don't see it working in
reality.
The concept that guys who front this
idea are talking about is called a "far ambush." The
responses from a conventional force light-infantry security forces
element? Lay down a base of fire, maneuver, indirect-fire support,
and close-air support.
So, yeah, there's some specific
applications of sniper teams/squads in UW. Not as much as a lot of
guys would like to think, but some.
Further, harassment by fire alone, even
if you kill one or two out of nine or ten every time (HIGHLY
unlikely, regardless of how bad-ass Gunny Hathcock you think you
are), you're still not going to win an UW campaign like that, because
at some point, in order to win, you're going to have to close with,
engage the enemy with overwhelming violence of action, and shoot the
motherfucker in the face.
A four-man team of guys who can hit
single-shot first-round hits at 500M is going to hell for more
effective, if they know how to apply that in the support-by-fire
role, than a six-man precision rifle team, who only knows the
one-shot method, because they're A) going to put a lot more effective
rounds downrange, B) actually be capable of maneuvering against the
enemy, and C) put enough EFFECTIVE suppressive fire downrange to keep
the enemy's head down, so they can break contact.
One, two, or six rounds isn't going to
phase me. I'm not going to stand on a fucking ridgeline, pulling a
Patton, like a pop-up target on the qualification range, or some
Cornwallis on an Appleseed range. If you get to see me, it's going to
be as I kneel down next to one of my guys, to point out to him where
to engage most effectively, then I'm going to be moving again, and
trust me on this. I'm a decade older than I was in the 'Stan, have
even more injuries, and worse arthritis than I did then, and I can
STILL move faster, kitted up for war, in the field, than competitive
athletes can (I prove it regularly). The precision rifle team isn't
going to "pin me down" that way, and as soon as the first
round comes in, my people are going to be maneuvering, FAST, to
counter the threat, with adequate fire to keep you from getting away,
while some of my guys move to get around you, out of sight (out of
mind).
If you don't know, understand, and
apply the fundamental individual and common tasks skills that
centuries of armed conflict between humans have proven work and work
well, you're not going to survive, let alone win. There's nothing new
in the art and science of war, boys and girls. Quit trying to make it
fancier than it is. A sublime master of the fundamentals is advanced
skill in any physical discipline.
Nous Defions!
John Mosby
Interesting post.
ReplyDeletethough i like the appleseed for it's teaching of traditional marksmanship skills.
i'd also agree that most battles wont be won in the "attack the collumn of redcoats" fashion.
I'm an iraq vet....humvee machinegunner/mk-19 gunner by trade and modern war is well......messy and close.
however, i must add that the situation DOES dictate the tactics.
an effective sniper (or fear of)......heck in a MOUT AO, just a good marksman. Can tie up elements and do a good job at harasment.
But i would add that they MUST be disciplined to slink away after taking a shot (hit or miss) to avoid detection/manouver.
however, like you said, thats not closing with and destroying the enemy.
BUT the point of this post is.....i feel that if you game out whatever future conflict might arise..... likely facing a full platoon, or even a full squad will be the exception rather than the norm. let alone functioning indirect fires. Airsupport? maybe. At least in mountainous and sparsely populated AO's. (this is mountain guerilla right?)
I come to this when i look at the size of the opfor......and the size of the areas to be controlled. Even with FULL mobilization of active duty elements in violation of posse comm, theres just not enough boots to cover the ground. let alone regular domestic opfor. and factoring in attrition, desertion, lack of pay/ motivation, those that have a conscience and refuse unlawful orders, and primary movement of assets (especially air) to urban centers where the unrest will be worst. I personally believe that opfor will be present in: current numbers of domestic opfor, and a vastly diminished turnout of whatever guard/reserves are in the AO. maybe, MAYBE supplimented with understrength and strungout AD opfor.
So a FREFOR element may well only have the indigenous OPFOR elements that are already there.
If your mountains are like MY mountains, thats not very many.
The situation Dictates the Tactics, so i don't rule out a single player or small team with intermediate (eg. DMR...a4-acog) equipment being able to deliver decisive blows against a single victor with one or two occupants on a lonely mountain road. Especially if combined with a disabling strike against the vic, and out of comms/cell range due to remoteness.
or, i may be completely wrong.
The Dude voice: thats just like, my opinion man.
SoL
I definitely think that you are on to something about snipers. A sniper can be a great force multiplier, but a sniper can not win a conflict alone. That shit only belongs in video games and movies. Especially when going up against a conventional military, the second the sniper takes his shot the platoon leader is going to suppress with everything he has and call in indirect fire support. The only thing that would change the dynamics of that scenario is a suppressor and a sniper that is really good at building/finding hides. What is your opinion of a fire team sized sniper element outfitted with suppressors?With your training would you be able to find a sniper team with suppressors that were hidden in a well camouflaged hide.
ReplyDeleteWe don't spend a lot of time on 500 yard shots because where we live there is no open terrain. Period. We focus on CQB and 100 yard contacts. I think there's a little too much focus on "warfare" and not on "LAWfare", ie what a lot of people discovered after Katrina: the law came back and bit them in the ass.
ReplyDeleteI can't envision a scenario in America where 500 yard sniper shots are something that needs to be actively planned for, as a training priority...
But I live in the South. Maybe you live out west, where the land is much more open.
I would be very cautious about shooting people at extreme distances, unless (literally) the Russians have landed or nukes have detonated, etc.
I think the name of the blog answers your statement. Mountain - landmass that projects conspicuously above its surroundings and is higher than a hill. Guerrilla - a person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit carrying out harassment and sabotage. JM lives out west where shots can easily reach 500m. The purpose of JM's blog is to teach people what to do if the government kicks down your door. After your door gets kicked down, I do not think you will care about the spirit of the law.
DeleteFlat out fuk'n amazing to me how many folks are still worried about being ubercompliant and following the letter of the law. You really don't have any grasp of the situation being discussed here, do you? Bunch of Barney Fife's, still want to show folks your concealed permit and how well you keep everything locked up, just in case they come knockin... Folks, the law went out the door a long time ago, whatever happens today may be your last chance to fight and go down like a man. I myself have about had a snoutful of all the do-gooder warnings on the blogs, somebody always warning us dummies to have our paperwork in order and not discuss anything inappropriate, or lecturing someone on the legalities of a CWP, or making sure your weapons are all unloaded and locked up when transporting to the range, or being extra polite to the LEO out looking for a free blowjob....
DeleteTom S., out here in Wyoming, a 1,000 yard shot is normal, if you have enough gun. And, 2 - 5 miles is how far you can see the enemy, almost anywhere. 500 yards is normal rifle range practice in the USMC, for every single recruit, women included. Nothin special or fancy about 500 yd hits with a service rifle and open sights, happens every single day.
Practice with what you have, it's where you are going to be fighting anyway. But some of us have long range issues to deal with on an everyday basis, not just snipers.
The beginning of CAS for local govt/LE:
ReplyDelete"Chief Deputy Randy McDaniel of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Texas told The Daily that his department is considering using rubber bullets and tear gas on its drone."
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/groups-concerned-over-arming-of-domestic-drones/
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/64-drone-bases-on-us-soil/
Delete"at some point, in order to win, you're going to have to close with, engage the enemy with overwhelming violence of action, and shoot the motherfucker in the face."
ReplyDeleteOutstanding! I love this blog. Informative AND entertaining.
Independent units/non-gov units, or individuals of normal means and normal training (30% vets, <10% combat MOS's, <1 former sniper team element member) are not going to have the time/ability/cash/contacts to develop US Military sniper school skill levels and ability that can turn into a sniper team with the ability to be in the right place at the right time. It just won't happen and can't be something to be depended on.
ReplyDeleteWhat can be done is improve the skills of a militiaman or irregular to the level of regular infantry. A few may be capable and willing to maintain and improve their skills to be "designated marksmen". Accurate fire means less fire, which is required when ammo is hard to come by. Irregular forces have uhhh- "irregular" supplies on no particular schedule. You've got a thing when you are carrying it in your ruck, or you might know where some more could be got 'cause you buried a 5 gallon bucket (or Schedule40 tube) somewhere back in the good-old-days (now).
Don't forget that even with the advantage of home terrain, irregular freefor's will take a lot of losses, compared to the professional-expensive opfor. Distant shooting combined with EFP/IED's minimizes defensive man losses while maximizing cost to the invader. They will give up when it's too expensive and not that important.
PT now. Running and hiding is almost a plan. Gotta be able to run to get to a hide. PT now.
Cheers.
Entire article. Simply - well - said, all of it.
ReplyDeleteDrive on & thanks.
(and yeah, you are more entertaining)
Didn't you hear?
ReplyDeleteThe enemies of freedom will advance on our collective benchrests from a mile away over a flat field clear of obstructions at walking pace on a bright, windless day in single file.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6qWlSB6eOI
At least that's how every fat bastard pictures it I suppose...
More likely they'll go into Cheeto withdrawls by day two.
I think it's a moot point. Most folks I know can't hit shit! Up close OR hundreds of yards away!
ReplyDelete"Faze," not "phase." Common error, and the spellchecker won't help. Possibly induced by having watched Star Trek.
ReplyDeleteOtherwise, total agreement about the shooting stuff.
Knowing the standard response to a "far" ambush is to maneuver around its flanks via covered approaches means that obstacles and a hidden "near" ambush on likely avenues of approach make a sniper a a sporty proposition to reduce with anything less than a well-drilled company and supporting arms, long as we don't get sucked into defending the ambush long after it's prudent to depart, yes?
ReplyDelete- Aesop
I am no vet nor a tactician (weak point I must address) but it seems to me:
ReplyDeleteThree to five separate 3-man teams (shooter/spotter/security) operating at a 400-600 distance, in concert (with comms) can surround and give a small (<50) enemy force fits, especially if they can keep moving after every shot or two, and can also give one another supporting fire in case of counterattack by the enemy. If they are using suppressors the enemy may have no idea where the shots originate except from "all around". Not good for the enemy directing suppressive organic or indirect fire, or deciding which way to flank. And I have to wonder what kind of indirect fires non-military forces can conjure. JM's doctrine seems to be directed mostly toward regular military forces with the full spectrum of support weapons available (the worst-case enemy), but the opfor may not always be that.
If you combine this multiple-team mobile marksman force with JM's requirement of an up-close-shoot-'em-in-the-face element (far ambush plus near ambush), that might make a real crap sandwich for the enemy.
Having your people trained up to 500 yd. iron-sight-from-sling-prone hit skill ahead of time is a good thing nonetheless, since you will not always be in charge of dictating the distance you have to shoot, and as pointed out above, it helps conserve precious ammo. Good CQB skills within 100 yds but incompetence beyond 200 (not directed towards any posters here) leaves a big chink in your armor (and vice-versa). Plus, the closer you let the enemy get the more dangerous they are to you. I am too old and out of shape to be running around in even the foothills of the Rockies humping a ruck, but I can still hit way out there (both of which characteristics apply to most of my friends), so I have to figure out how to best apply the skills I have.
But again, I'm not a small unit tactician, so I may be way off the mark (gotta keep reading here to catch up). I'd way rather shoot them from far away than up close, but I've also made sure most of my rifles have a bayonet. Gotta brush up on my bayonet drill. No, I'm not kidding. We should all be able to operate efficiently from 500 yards to teeth-in-the-throat distance. If you don't know hand-to-hand, get some serious practical training. Learn to use your small and big knives effectively. Become expert with your pistols. And the teeth-in-the-throat bit was not a joke. When you run out of ammo, and the bayonet and buttstock break off, and your Ka-Bar is stuck fast in someone's body, hands feet and teeth are all you will have left. If you don't think it can get that bad, you are kidding yourself. TRAIN!
For an unsurprisingly applicable example of how a numerically inferior force with far ambush skills can prevail, review the account of the march from Concord bridge back to Boston, April 1775, by the British regulars.
ReplyDelete"History doesn't repeat, but it rhymes."
-Aesop
As much as I'm a patriot and love my history, Lexington-Concord is not an applicable example. The militias of 1775 did not have to contend with combined arms doctrine or air superiority. They did not lack basic military equipment the way the modern unorganized militia does. We're not dealing with a numerically superior enemy, we're dealing with a strategically superior enemy. A conventional military can call in an air strike or indirect fire to deal with threats without engaging, and militia have no way to effectively fight in the air. The militia of 1775 could afford conventional defenses because the technology gap was small; now we'd just get bombed. What they did then would not work now, and though it's good to pass on that riflemen heritage, small arms expertise alone is only going to go so far.
ReplyDeleteJust as valuable as being able to shoot is being able to network with people, hide and cache supplies, establish effective propaganda operations, and use engineering assets to shape the battlefield. Traditional military skills are only one part of the picture, though they have to be mastered to keep everything grounded in reality.
Air power failed to win in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, Grenada, Panama, Mogadischu, Bosnia, GW1, Iraq, or Afghanistan. It has only ever been decisive twice: Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.
ReplyDeleteUnless I've misread things, we've just spent 10 years proving that air power and combined arms don't work in areas you can't or won't blow the living crap out of, like cities.
Boots on the ground, and long range marksmanship, just the opposite.
When the insurgents sued for a truce in Fallujah, their first condition wasn't the removal of planes, tanks, APCs, or drones.
They wanted the withdrawal of the snipers.
A modern insurgency isn't going to be Les Maquis in the woods - they'll simply be burned out, gassed out, or stricken by drone-launched Hellfires and AC-130 fires.
It's going to be in cities, because that's where the enemy is, where the resources are, and where air power and supporting arms use is negated, thus effectively non-existant.
Just like on the road from Concord to Boston in 1775.
Best regards,
-Aesop
Dear Sir,
ReplyDeleteAs an Infantryman(though no longer serving) with multiple combat tours, I enjoy reading your blog and look forward to your new posts. This particular post I found to be rather interesting for a few reasons. These reasons are best summed up with a few pieces of information I would like to share for the common good:
1) As I recall, something like 1/3 of the weapons used by the VC during the conflict in SE Asia were captured from US or ARVN forces. You can't capture shit from 500 meters away. Eventually, your ammo will run out(or your weapon will break) and you will need to get one from somewhere. Think about it. Also probably be a good idea to familiarize yourself with weapons you expect the opposition to have.
2)The last significant bayonet combat(at least as far as I know) took place in Basra, Iraq 2004. Close combat does still happen. Sheer guts and violence of action is what enabled that British army unit to attack and destroy a larger element of insurgents, without all of that "support" we always here so much about. Sheer guts and extreme violence of action will win fights, large and small.
3)If you take the various politics out of it(and even then most of the time politics is what's effecting SUT), Small unit tactics wins and loses guerrilla war. It's that simple. If you look at the successful guerrilla and counter-insurgency campaigns that is always a common factor. Hell even if you look at the unsuccessful campaigns, SUT is one of the things that did work when it was employed properly.
So in closing, please keep up the good work. This is by far the best blog I've seen yet. Everyone else is doing the chicken little thing, with no suggestions as to what we can do in the mean time. Please do not get discouraged by all of the "keyboard commandos" who ultimately don't know their ass from a hole in the ground anyway.
So to everyone else: Since we are in a time and place where we can still get ammo and weapons at our leisure(though they are getting more expensive) get your people out and start training. Get everyone's weapons zeroed. Get used to moving and shooting with live ammo. If you don't have the facilities for live fire maneuver, at least get airsoft or something and train that way. That $1000 rifle isn't doing anyone any good sitting in the closet unzeroed collecting dust.
Oh and I almost forgot an important one:
ReplyDelete4) No plan survives the first enemy contact intact. Even if your plan is to engage at long distance and then get out of dodge, shit happens. So you should plan and train to fight at moderate and close range. As the incident in 2004 illustrates, it does still happen.
Aesop, you misunderstand or are ignorant of the use of air power and combined arms. Air power crippled German industrial capabilities during WWII, and brought the war onto German soil. WWII marked the first use of Airborne troops, and that method of troop delivery was responsible for strategic victories in WWII and Korea. In Mogadishu, a convoy (armor and mechanized asset) supported by helicopters (air asset) was responsible for successful exfil of Task Force Ranger. Air power is a huge part of the US military's modern supply chain, moving troops, supplies, and equipment into and out of theater, more so than even the Navy.
ReplyDeleteFallujah is a great example of the effectiveness of combined arms on an insurgent faction. Engineering assets cleared the roads and shut off the power supply to the city preceding ground movement. Before the first ground assault, air and artillery assets shelled the city, and are largely credited with limiting insurgent mobility. A total of 276 air strikes and over 1,500 artillery rounds were pumped into the city, not including mortars. It was a common response to air strike a threat instead of trying to clear it. Though snipers punched above their weight, they accounted for about 100 of over 1,000 casualties. Resupply was accomplished largely by helicopters.
Assuming OPFOR is not willing to shell cities into the ground, which is not guaranteed, how do you plan to move troops and equipment if predator drones are overhead doing 24 hour security ops? What if they cut water supplies to the city and control the issue of water through military supply chains? If you can take a city, how do you plan to defend it when its most valuable features, such as factories, can be bombed at Mach speed with minimal risk to OPFOR's personnel?
There's a lot to be learned from the Revolutionary War, but let's keep things in perspective. This is not 1775, and OPFOR is not the British Army. If you want to look at a historical example of what to expect, look at Waco, or Communist China's suppression of their citizens. We have threats today that didn't exist during the times of the Founding Fathers, and we have to be aware of them.